Research has generally shown that the church and mosque play some role in immigrant political integration, especially mobilization. In Finland, this is not yet known as no research has yet examined it on immigrants. This leaves a gap on whether the church and/or the mosque play such role on them. This paper seeks to fill this gap, using Black African immigrants as case study through in-depth interviews. The focus is on political mobilization at the municipal level where many immigrants in Finland have full local suffrage. The study does not just examine the role of the church and mosque in mobilization in conventional politics (such as voting, party membership, campaigning), but also in the unconventional (such as protests, strikes, boycotts). Findings however reveal that both religious institutions play a relatively little role in these two regards. In the following sections, existing literature on the role of the church and the mosque on immigrant political involvement generally would be reviewed, followed by a brief discussion on immigrants and religion in Finland, as well as an explanation of the data collection for this paper. Next is a discussion on the theoretical concept of political mobilization, and an overview of the institutions for political mobilization. Then, the role of the church and the mosque in the political mobilization of African immigrants in Finland comes in, followed by the conclusion where all discussions are synthesized.
and Anglican, as well as in the mosques. Besides, churches and mosques are sometimes used to mobilize members for protests or demonstrations against unfavorable political decisions. All these make the church and the mosque extremely important in Nigerian and Ghanaian politics respectively, especially during general elections, to the extent that sometimes, some pastors and priests are indirectly 3 bribed by politicians to speak in favor of their candidate and/or party before their congregants. 4 Wong (2006) also writes that in the US, religious leaders not only mobilize voters through sermons and informal discussions, but also involve them in practical political mobilization itself. She further argues that this is ingrained in church's democracy and culture, as well as in members' volunteering work ethic in which they contact church members and nonmembers alike to vote for their choice candidates or party. Wong cites some immigrants, especially
Chinese immigrant, as acknowledging the church as being instrumental to their active political participation. Harris (1994) also asserts that black churches in the US, for instance, play an important role in mobilizing its congregants to engage in political involvement, which includes voting, enrolling as political party members, and joining political protests/demonstrations when necessary. Such mobilization also includes their contacting church members and non-members alike to vote for their choice candidates in anticipation of good results for their church and group. In other words, political mobilization somewhat ignites or reminds of the group consciousness and identity among them, and religious interpretations are sometimes used to encourage this and enhance mobilization and participation. In Britain also, Galandini (2012) affirms that black churches provide similar setting for Blacks, where they not only gain important political and social information for political involvement and group consciousness, but also hone their political skills for political representation and leadership. She further argues that in building group consciousness, for example, black churches also serve as a place of refuge, where blacks experiencing racial discrimination and deprivation in the host society find psychological and spiritual comfort through sharing with members their experiences and getting psychological and spiritual assistance as well as also material protection and social support (See also Haapajärvi 2012) . In this way, the churches also discover and reinforce a strong sense of belonging in the host society which is quite necessary for group political mobilization. 5 For Calhoun- Brown (1996) however, it is instead politicized black churches and not just any black church that encourages and fosters such consciousness and political mobilization among its members.
Furthermore, in Ireland also, Fanning and O'Boyle (2009, 23-24) also discover that African immigrants emphasize the role of the Church as 'a social place' that gives them a sense of belonging in Irish society. In fact, some Africans, they say, argue that the church or their religious belief has greatly influenced their active political mobilization and participation. Fanning and O'Boyle thus affirm that the church then becomes a motivational stake that fosters a bonding capital among them, but that this bonding capital, for some, did not eventually and unfortunately translate into bridging capital with the Irish society because of reasons of racism. However, they point out that a few tried to bridge this racial gap by joining Irish organizations rather than just staying put in African churches and associations (ibid p.37).
When it comes to the mosque, it also plays an important role in political mobilization. For example, Abbasali Farahati, of the Public University of Kashan, Iran, in his 2011 "The Mosque as the First Political-Ideological Base in the Islamic Society" describes the mosque as the first political center in Islamic society, arguing that "from the beginning of the emergence of the mosque in Islamic civilization… mosques were not only built for worshipping the Unique God", but also serve as an institution for political information sharing and mobilization where Muslims play active role in monitoring government' activities and declaring their opinions on political issues aimed towards taking significant roles in government's decisions that affect them (ibid, pp. 146-151) . Thus, in this role of the mosque, political Islam was born, which according to Amel Boubekeur (2007, 14) denotes a recourse to Islam as the first justification for most political actions by Muslims, because it is where demands are made by Islamic authorities on Muslim faithful for active participation in the political process. Jamal (2005) Americans (especially the US-born), increases their political participation, whereas for AfricanAmerican Muslims, especially those who are older, regular attendance does not necessarily translate into increased political participation (ibid, pp.524, 527-8) . However, Eggert and Giugni (2011) argue that it is membership in the mosque rather than regular attendance that has a positive impact on the political involvement of Muslim migrants.
In any case, what these arguments show is that the mosque and the church play a significant role in immigrant political mobilization. In Finland, this might be possible but in the absence of any such research yet 6 , we cannot say whether or not the above arguments could be of any relevance to African immigrant political mobilization. Although party mobilization was also studied in previous studies, whether they use religious institutions or not to mobilize was never mentioned. (Martikainen 2004, 114-6) .
Immigrants and Religion in Finland
This paved the way for immigrants that arrived later to follow existing religions (Martikainen 2004; Ketola et al. 2014 non-religious (Martikainen 2011 (Martikainen , 2014 Christians have great trust on their leaders or not, is one of the major aims of this paper.
Data Collection
The data collection method used is qualitative in-depth interviews with 50 African immigrants, male (N=35) and female (N=15), 9 legally resident in Finland, especially in five cities of Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa, Tampere and Jyväskylä, which altogether have the largest number of African immigrants in Finland, and so could provide enough representative sample for this study.
Nonetheless, a few opinions were also sought from some other Africans living in other municipalities. In-depth interview is essential for this study because it provides detailed insights into personal experiences and explanations on the topic in question (Kvale 1996) . And qualitative method was chosen because it helps examine life as it is lived, situations as they are constructed, and things as they happen within a context of inquiry (Wood 1999) . Interviewees were randomly selected 10 and informed of the purpose of the interview and the confidentiality of their identity unless they want it made public. But only one person allowed his name published; other names used are therefore pseudonyms. Interviews were conducted during 2014 and 2015, using face-to-face contacts, Skype, Facebook, and/or phone calls. Each interview lasted for about 15 to 40 minutes.
The questions that guided them include whether participants have been politically mobilized through the church or mosque, and whether their church or mosque is formally or informally used for political mobilization by politicians and/or church leaders, especially during general elections.
I have analyzed the interviews thematically, reading each interview transcription well, and marking down themes and elements of interest, such as respondents' countries of origin, whether they have been successfully politically mobilized in the church/mosque, have been mobilizers themselves, and the results. Also included are whether/how close they are to their religious or lay leaders in the church/mosque, or with their fellow congregants, and whether/how these leaders or fellow congregants have influenced their political mobilizations. Importantly, the way they interpret their experiences and the usage or non-usage of their church/ mosque for political mobilization was also of interest, including the similarities and differences in their responses. This is especially important in making implicit comparisons between Christians and Muslims.
The theoretical concept of political mobilization
Although there are only a few studies focusing exclusively on the methodological task of operationalizing political mobilization (Salat et al. 2013) there are some concrete attempts to define it. Peter Vermeersch (2011), for instance, defines political mobilization as a process where people (e.g. electoral candidates, campaigners, political parties, community/association leaders, or even ordinary individuals) typically persuade others to engage in the political process or some kind of political action or activism. The key focus is usually on the observed political behavior of individuals and/or groups who mobilize and/or are mobilized (Salat et al. 2013 ). Political mobilization can take place in four different layers, namely: local (micro), regional (meso), national (macro) and international (global) (ibid). This paper is mainly concerned with the local.
Mobilizations at the local level (just like in any other level anyway) could either be conventional/electoral (e.g. voting, campaigning, joining a political party, union, etc) or unconventional/non-electoral (e.g. protest, boycott, hunger strike, lobbying, public statements, etc).
Although in political science, political mobilization has been commonly tied to electoral politics (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Vermeersch 2011 ) the effects of electoral campaigning (Shanto and Simon 2000 in Vermeersch 2011) and/or to explain the fluctuations in voter turnout (Vermeersch 2011 citing Franklin 2004 it has also been extended to the field of unconventional (or contentious)
politics (Martiniello 2007 ). Martiniello argues that in unconventional politics, "political mobilization refers to the process of building collective actors and collective identity" because "demonstrating on your own does not really make much political sense", but when done collectively, it gives strong political meaning (ibid). Also, Vermeersch (2011) be an improvement in their socioeconomic situation owing to racial discrimination. It might also be educational (e.g. on non introduction of school fees 11 ) and on environment.
Furthermore, in "Toward a theory of Political Mobilization" (1974, 138) , David R. Cameron opines that the most important result in the whole process of political mobilization is the expected increase in the whole scope and exercise of franchise by franchised citizens, as well as also on the potential increase in political mass organizations and/or in political party memberships. He further argues that the extent to which political mobilization involves political induction of people depends largely on the existence and strength of an organization or institution (e.g. religious/social organization, political party, government, etc), or a political agent (e.g. a campaigner) in the process of political mobilization, which through its recruitment process, promotional drives, or the ability to create a favorable image of itself, especially to espouse in its rhetoric the solutions for current political exigencies in a local society, and to adapt its organization (or agency) to the existing demand thereof, may either succeed or fail in attracting new members to the political fold (ibid, p.140).
Therefore, "how the mobilizing agent changes the set of positive and negative political preferences in individuals through its self-promotional activities" is "the critical question which any explanation of political mobilization must address" (ibid). And the extent to which this is addressed also depends largely on how such organization (or agent) is able to convince individuals being mobilized to adopt new patterns of political behavior and discard their previously held pattern (ibid). For this to happen effectively thus, Cameron singles out two critical factors: 1) the extent to which the mobilizing agent adapts its ideology to articulate and give solution to local discontent; and 2) the extent to which it appropriates to its benefits the resources of the local society by penetrating and adapting to its purposes its organizational infrastructure (ibid). In the case of African immigrants, for any mobilizing agent to succeed in any promotional drive to mobilize them, be it in conventional or unconventional (political) platform, the person would first need to articulate and give solution to their local discontent (e.g. socioeconomic discrimination, school fees introduction, etc). Secondly, the agent would also need to penetrate and adapt to his/her benefits the organizational infrastructure of the local society in the promotional drive, which in the context of this paper, could be the church and/or the mosque.
Institutions for Political Mobilization
It is already clear that the existence and strength of an organization or an agent is very necessary to the successful political mobilization of people (Cameron 1974 (2000) and Martiniello (2007) respectively describe all others as "institutional gatekeepers" (Ireland) or "linking bodies" (Martinielo) between migrants and the host society which serve as "mobilizing structures", or "act as control access to the avenues of political participation available to immigrants in their host society" (Ireland 2000, 236-7) . In addition, they also "connect people to the state in particular ways, strengthening and weakening ethnic, class, and other collective identities in various places and at various times" (ibid). However, our interest in this paper is not on all of them but only on religious institutions such as the church and mosque. In mosques in Finland, formal political mobilization does not also seem to exist despite the fact that it has been described as a political center in Islamic society (Farahati 2011 Many African Muslims interviewed confirm this, arguing that they prefer it "outside the mosque building". But a few has the opposite view, emphasizing that they prefer it inside the mosque either as part of the sermon or during after sermon announcement. Those in this group argue that doing it this way is what any serious-minded Muslim candidate should do "to get the spirits of Muslims when it is still high". However, they note that for any Muslim candidate to use these mediums, s/he must have been known and respected among the Muslim faithful in that mosque. Also, his or her track record of attendance and active participation should also be known. "In this way, his (or her) political messages could appeal to the Muslim faithful because the political (campaign) message of less unknown or less respected Muslims do not appeal to anyone and no imam will even give a room to such a person to talk in the mosque, let alone talk on the person's behalf . In fact, it is better for such a person to use other campaign means than the mosque…." (Abdul, Ghanaian Muslim in Oulu, 14 June 2015) . This might also apply to Christian politicians who are not known among church members. However a Tanzanian political scientist in Espoo suggests that if a politician is popular in the society for good reasons but is weak in church attendance, s/he might still be successful in mobilizing church members because the good popularity s/he enjoys in the society would possibly overshadow the weak church attendance because church members are also society members.
Case of African immigrants in Finland at the municipal level
In general, many Christian and Muslim respondents believe that pasting campaign posters that contain electoral manifestoes on information boards at the church or mosque is one of the effective ways that candidates do sometimes use, but which should be used regularly because many
Christians and Muslims read the boards regularly (Interviews: 2-3 June 2015). Another said crucial method they said is the use of digital and online social media, such as mobile phone, facebook, twitter and Youtube. According to many, some candidates are also using this platform. This is important, they say, because "many voters no longer attend religious services, or not so regularly, and so, reaching them through these digital means is a better option" (ibid). Paul, a Liberian politician in Tampere, interestingly confirms that although he uses "direct physical approach in my campaign drive regularly, I also use online social media to communicate my invisible constituents…." (Interview: 15 June 2015). Some respondents also attest that they often use online social media to access campaign information, communicate with candidates, and ponder well before making voting decisions. On the other hand, some respondents however argue they prefer physical contact with candidates and therefore feel happy when they are approached by candidates/campaigners at the church or mosque in the manner described above. For instance, Kanda, a Zambian male member of Hosanna Church in Espoo, argues that "African candidates do usually come towards the end of church service, waiting outside the building, because no rightthinking pastor or reverend would allow political campaigns inside the church… I think the church is a sacred place and should be kept sacred all the time" (Interview: 4 January 2015). Also, for
Belinda, a Congolese female Catholic in Helsinki, "in my church, they (politicians) sometimes do come after Mass and talk to us about their (electoral) ambitions; but this is outside not inside (the church). They also distribute their campaign cards, and explain anything if you need explanation…." (Interview: 5 January 2015). Nevertheless although this campaigning is not usually done inside the church or mosque, the condoning of their being done within church or mosque premises can also be construed as an indirect approval by concerned religious leaders.
On the other hand, although it is clear that churches and mosques in Finland do not formally serve as arenas for political mobilization, it does happen that sometimes there are formal political encouragements from some church or mosque leaders during their sermons and/or after sermon conversations with congregants. For instance, Ubara, a Tanzanian Christian in Vantaa who attends the Turku Home Church -a splitter of the Finnish evangelical movement (Martikainen 2004) , argues that …. Some of my church-mates and I used to have political discussions with our pastor because he is good at discussing it. He is a great man in politics and usually reminds us during election time before concluding (church) service that we should remember to vote because our vote counts…that we should be part of decision-making…. (Interview: 10 January 2015)
Also, Baariq, an Angolan Muslim in Helsinki,
Our imam sometimes includes politics in his sermon, even outside election time, but more so, during it. He usually encourages us to vote in order that we should have adequate political representation because he believes that this is the key to stopping discrimination against immigrants in Finnish society… and I do usually vote because of this (Interview: 12 April 2015)
For Dimgba, an Ivorian Lutheran in Tampere, During election time, our pastor sometimes preaches about politics and morality in the pulpit, urging us to vote for morality. And she can discuss it extensively after church services with whoever is interested…I think I agree with her. Politics and morality should go together to enhance political morality (Interview: 12 November 2014)
In today's world of 'neutral morality', Susan Mendus (2009) makes a strong argument in her
Politics and Morality that politics needs to be fused with strong morality broadly speaking, in order to make the current tumultuous world a morally better place. The church and the mosque, being moral houses, could play a key role in this regard through sermons on politics and morality. And so, religious leaders who do this could be fulfilling a great moral duty not only to their locality, but also to the world. Similarly, religious leaders who also urge immigrants to vote, for example, in order to reduce their social exclusion through political representation, are also combining a great moral and civic duty to the world since they are contributing to its tolerance, fairness and solidarity. This could however be more or less relevant when such leaders are able to discern between good and bad electoral candidates as some of my respondents have argued that their church or mosque leaders do sometimes advise them to vote for a particular candidate or even party. For instance, Petra, a
Rwandan woman who attends the Assemblies of God, argues that "my pastor has once or twice or even thrice encouraged us to vote for a particular candidate during after service chats with him because he says they are good and could represent us well in the municipal council, and I did each time…." (Interview: 4 November 2014). Also, Rabiah, a Ghanaian Muslim in Helsinki argues that her immigrant imam does also advise them to vote for immigrant-friendly parties because "they would be of great help to our wellbeing in Finland, and I do vote for them" (Interview: 30 August 2015) . Whether the intention of these religious leaders is morality or merely partisan is not clear or known. Nevertheless, the possibility of hearkening to such advice depends on the trust those being advised have on them, as well as also on familiarity, co-nationality/ethnicity, and/or proximity in ideals or interests with them (Brown 2011; Dutton 2009 ). For instance, among respondents who have adhered to such advice, more than one-third has strong trust on their leaders, seeing them as those who have good spirit of discernment -i.e. being able to competently discern between good and evil. Co-ethnicity or nationality also comes next. For instance, a Sudanese Anglican faithful in Jyväskylä argues that he has two times voted for two different candidates "just because my pastor encouraged me to do so. I listened to him because he is my pastor and also because he is my tribesman, and not that I was really convinced of the candidates…. But I believe in the pastor, I
believe he knows who is good and who is not…and I voted…." (Interview: 31 March 2015).
Moreover, there are also political encouragements from lay leaders in the church and mosque, as well as also from among congregants themselves, especially through their own initiated political discussions, usually after church services or meetings. The lay leaders, for example, are usually leaders of intra-church or intra-mosque associations such as various men/women/youth organizations and pious societies/prayer groups. The political encouragements they usually give are said to be of two types, namely: the ones made during association meetings and the ones made after, especially while leaving the church premises. In the first, it is usually more general, non-personal, non-partisan, and therefore cannot be termed a campaign for any candidate or party, but a general advice to church or mosque members to vote during election time because "it is your civic duty". In the second, it is usually partisan, personal, and selfish, because it is aimed at supporting a particular candidate or party. Usually it takes a form of a dialogue between a leader and a member.
One in four interviewees attests to having been approached by a church or mosque lay leader in this manner. Some respondents also affirm that this has sometimes made them doubtful of their own candidates, to the extent of their dumping these candidates for the leader's own candidates. Such dialogue also happens among the congregants themselves with similar result. Sometimes, it also takes the form of a group discussion after church services or mosque prayers with attendant pro et contra argumentations, usually on which candidate/party to vote for, and why. This sometimes heats up to the extent that consensus is usually impossible. For instance, a Nigerian man in Helsinki who goes to Redeemed Christian Church of God opines that, "Yes, it is usually difficult to agree on a particular party or candidate or both," said the Nigerian, "because everybody often has their own candidate or party. This might lead to a quarrel when someone tries to lord their arguments over others in the bid to persuade them to vote for their candidates or parties. That is why at the end of it all, nobody convinces anybody" (Interview: 8 January 2015).
Critically, some respondents argue that they find political participation sometimes a thing to be discarded even when religious influences (such as church leaders or fellow congregants) advise on the contrary. A factor that plays a decisive role in this is their poor social and economic status, which has also generated some kind of group consciousness among them. It has been established in research that most Africans in Finland face racial discrimination, especially in social life and the labor market, regardless of their level of education, length of stay in Finland, and Finnish language skills (Egharevba & Hannikanen 2005; Forsander 2008 , Rastas 2013b Ndukwe 2015) . This is also despite the Finnish Non-Discrimination Act (2004) This mobilizing strategy follows Cameron's theoretical assertion in which a mobilizing agent is expected to adapt his/her promotional drive to address a local discontent of the group being mobilized. However, in the case above, ethnicity or immigrant status appears to hamper it. The impact of ethnicity on voting decision has been documented in research (Vermeersch 2011; Bergh and Bjorklund, 2011; Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets 2013; Fisher et al. 2015) . Key findings indicate that visible minorities are more likely to vote for members of their own ethnic or racial group than otherwise, especially when they are victims of structural discrimination. This implies that they probably nurse doubts about members of the majority population. Another possible reason is that municipal elections are not usually taken seriously by some African immigrants unlike the parliamentary which they believe is more important since parliament makes laws that could change immigrant marginalized socioeconomic situation unlike municipalities that lack such powers.
However, being that many African immigrants do not qualify to vote in parliamentary elections yet since it requires Finnish citizenship which many do not yet have, they however do not also vote in municipal elections, thereby staying in political limbo. As an alternative, many draw closer to the church (or the mosque) as a means of succor from the socioeconomic marginalization (Haapajärvi 2012 ). Dutton argues that "people may be more inclined to become religiously involved as immigrants" because it provides them with social status and protection from racial stigmatization (Dutton 2009, 34, 38 experience, and so do not feel this same way. But it also confirms the accusation that their seeking immigrant votes was simply to get elected. Jamal (1995, 532) argues that it is not enough for a candidate to claim to identify with a marginalized group; it will be good if s/he also has some racism experience in order to feel what the group feel, and hence represent them well.
Furthermore, in the informal political sector, such as protests, demonstrations, strikes, etc, political mobilization in the church or mosque seems far-fetched, despite their societal marginalization.
According to Peter, an official of the Church of Pentecost International, "At worst, we write (protest) letters to the appropriate authority where we table out our concerns or disagreements on issues that concern or worry us and ask for a fair hearing. In most cases, our concerns are addressed accordingly. But even when not, we usually continue to write or visit until it is addressed. We never have to go out to protest. That is not the role of a church. It is instead the role of secular associations I think…." (Interview: 27 March 2015) . A good number of Islamic leaders concur, adding that "the best thing to do in a dire situation is to go to the relevant agency in person and complain in a civilized manner" (Interview: 22 May 2015) . This is interesting, given the Islamic role of the mosque as a political center where such mobilization is prepared. The Arab Spring is a good example (Hoffman & Jamal 2014; Ardıc 2012) . Ardıc (2012, 38) argues that besides being a house of prayer, the mosque also functions "as a locus of anti-government agitation and logistical centers of preparation for demonstrations". However many African Christian and Muslim respondents opine that in a quiet country like Finland it makes sense for a church or mosque to avoid being seen as radical through encouraging its members to roam the streets in protests, or engage in strikes.
They further attest that the protests they have so far engaged in in Finland mostly came from secular associations/unions such as labor/student unions, and/or environmental organizations (e.g.
Greenpeace). Nonetheless, the writing of protest letters, the contacting of the relevant agency, or actual visiting of their offices even if in a civilized manner, is all forms of politics (Martiniello 2007) .
Conclusion
This paper has examined and analyzed the role of the church and mosque in the political mobilization of African immigrants in Finland. Findings reveal more similarities than differences.
In other words, while formal mobilization was seldom done in both institutions, informal mobilization was fairly common. Part of the reason is the tacit belief that the church and the mosque are respectively sacred and therefore should be kept separate from mundane politics. However, even though many religious leaders do not allow formal mobilization in the church or mosque, some are said to preach about politics during sermons, or engage congregants in political conversations, especially at election times, to encourage them to vote. But it is good to note that adherence to such encouragements usually depends on the trust congregants have on the leader, which might include whether both are from the same country, ethnic group, share similar religious ideals or political interests, or are in close friendship or marriage. This is particularly crucial in a multinational African church or mosque, and also in the face of the socioeconomic discrimination that Africans face in Finnish society.
Nevertheless, by largely preventing formal political mobilization, the church and mosque in Finland, unlike their counterparts in the UK, Ireland, and the US respectively (Galandini 2012; Jamal 2005; Fanning and O'Boyle 2009) 
